Strange is the fate of the business leader, whose task is to relentlessly seek new ways to create value. Yet they are not alone. Economists too, by studying the behavior of markets and actors, aim to identify sources and levers of value creation. With this difference: economics seeks to be a science—descriptive, even predictive—that is, a neutral and objective instrument. It wants “what it counts” to be “what counts.”

But neither businesspeople nor economists can truly objectify value. Business models and theories always involve intellectual choices, sometimes even political ones, based on more or less explicit norms (that is, values). The endless controversies over the ranking of these values lead each side to accuse the other of being ideological. Can truth be sacrificed if lies are profitable? Is the useful really superior to the trivial, if the trivial sells? Is the notion of the good the merchant’s concern? Each claims: “what matters to you is what suits you.” A brief genealogy of attempts to rationally rank “what counts” may help us move beyond this dialogue of the deaf.

Value is always already there: the beauty of the world is priceless. The expression “value creation” is therefore misleading, as it suggests that nothing of value exists prior to human intervention. This confusion becomes dangerous when financialized economies claim to create value ex nihilo through speculation—value that vanishes when bubbles burst, or in the collapse of Ponzi schemes and subprime markets. Should we rather speak of “value production,” letting go of the idea of ex nihilo creation in favor of the notion that it is labor that “produces” value?

At the origins of modern economic theory, Adam Smith argued that value is created by productive labor. Labor transforms natural resources into useful goods, and in doing so, makes the producer the rightful owner. Marx would later criticize this shift—from an economic relationship with nature to a power relationship instituted through property rights—where the economic norm (usefulness) becomes the foundation of the legal norm (justice). Despite its scientific ambition, Marx was already “working from his values”: he bequeathed to economics the idea that matter is formless and acquires economic value only when transformed by a subject—at the expense of nature, seen as having no intrinsic value. This is why we believe that value is “produced.” A myth at the root of the extractivist logic that fueled the industrial revolutions.

→ What counts is what results from the production of labor: real labor must be rewarded and valued more than rent or stock market speculation (Piketty, 2013).

The problem with considering labor as the sole condition for creating value is that individuals who benefit from the producers’ work may have different expectations—a challenge notably faced by the planned economies of communist regimes. The value created may be valid for all, but not for me: I not only need to work, but also to access goods and services that are useful to me, based on my own criteria.

Marginalist economists addressed this issue by shifting the criterion of value from the collective to the individual. It is satisfaction—what each person derives from a good or service—that determines value, with the market replacing planning as the central mechanism for coordination and for revealing what matters. Value is created the moment someone is willing to pay more than what a good or service costs to produce, because it matches their preference.

The question of a shared value optimum arises on a global scale: does everyone benefit sufficiently—according to their own criteria—from how value is created, distributed, and used? Value originates from our choices and consumption, but is captured by those who distribute goods and services, often without producing them, and with the goal of selling more than is truly needed. Today, the raw material of value is no longer just nature, but also our desires and wants.

→ What counts is what sparks desire, and reflects the uniqueness of its social utility.

The economic norm that governs exchanges is the interplay of supply and demand: consumers have the choice to buy or not, and sellers, to adapt to their market—or not. Producers must “deal with” this desire to consume, balancing the value they derive from their labor with their own desire or need to access certain goods and services, sometimes by asserting their own individual standards: the consumer is an actor who makes choices based on preferences, in ways that are more or less determined or free.

Legal norms come into play here to address the gap between the two, by regulating exchanges (competition law, intellectual property law, labor law, consumer protection, etc.). Economic science builds models to optimize collective production capacities, individual purchasing power, and industrial distribution capabilities—trying to predict how this balance will evolve, in order to support public policy in addressing or mitigating potential imbalances. Various norms come into conflict here: the public interest, represented by the state through law (what is permitted and forbidden); the interests of individuals (as producers, distributors, and consumers); the interests of private companies and other stakeholders. And also the norms economists use to construct their models (inspired by mathematics, biology, behavioral sciences, the humanities, etc.)…

→ What counts is to accept the limits of our individual and collective decision-making capacities (cf. Simon’s bounded rationality, 1957), to shift perspectives in order to prioritize competing interests, and to let go of what matters least.

Building on this understanding, certain economic theories adopt a more systemic perspective, taking into account the interdependencies between stakeholders. The economics of the commons (cf. E. Ostrom, 1990) emphasizes collective management and cooperation, even considering the recognition of non-human entities as legal subjects. Institutional economics (cf. Chassagnon and Dutraive, 2020) acknowledges the social construction of economic norms and positions economics as a description of relationships between actors—through mechanisms such as transaction costs, for example.

The study of value is thus equipped with frameworks for balancing economic efficiency, social justice, and the respect of planetary boundaries. The fair distribution of resources and opportunities depends on these complex trade-offs (A. Sen, 2009), which must be the subject of rational, inclusive debate involving all stakeholders to ensure a collective and appropriate approach to value creation.

→ What counts is the process and the outcome of including stakeholders in evaluation criteria—the impact of public decisions, economic actors, business models, and individual behavior on both people and the planet.

To someone unfamiliar with the evolution of economic theory, value creation might seem to be nothing more than a power struggle between actors with unequal capacities for action—an imbalance that must be addressed, economically and politically. Fortunately, the humanities, as scientific disciplines, shed light on this. Economics and the human sciences share the same object of study, but view value through opposing lenses: on one side, the calculation of a viable optimum; on the other, the understanding of how individual values are socially constructed and articulated. This confusion even filters into our everyday decisions, as we hesitate between what brings us money or pleasure, and what benefits us more broadly—such as weighing work against life, or choosing to produce sustainably while still growing in the face of limited resources.

We are influenced by so many norms and parameters that trying to rationally articulate our choices can feel either impossible or futile: let things be and do what we can, or resist and do what we must. Yet, the “polytheism of values” (M. Weber, 1919) does not condemn us to disenchanted relativism—it opens up space to create value, in every sense of the word. It can be rational for an individual to choose to cooperate—even against their immediate self-interest—and to defer to the general interest, following a deliberative process that balances competing norms.

Sociologists can describe individual and collective decisions in a rational way, acknowledging the limits of our decision criteria—as long as we accept that those criteria are situated (Boudon, 2012). It is rational to bring all actors’ evaluation criteria into debate, through a process that ensures everyone can express their own standards, see them taken into account, and participate in defining the rules of deliberation. Each person must be willing to abide by the collective judgment—one whose criteria for arbitration have been openly discussed and agreed upon (Rawls, 1997).

→ What counts is taking control of the criteria by which value is defined—debating them, reaching consensus, and making decisions that align the true, the just, and the useful.

In conclusion, our individual and collective choices shape our reality: the coherence between our beliefs, our actions, and our evaluative tools is what creates value—through the decision-making process by which it is constructed.